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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interview of Christopher Carney
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Team Numbers: One
Location: Pentagon
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Interviewee Background

(U) Carney is an assistant professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University. He is also a Naval Intelligence reservist. In January 2002, he was mobilized to work at NIST [National Institute for Standards and Technology?], but was reassigned to work for Douglas Feith, the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, prior to his activation. Carney completed his tour of duty under Feith and returned to Pennsylvania in late 2002, at which time Feith requested that he return to work on Iraq and military detainee policy matters. Carney took unpaid leave from Pennsylvania State and has been a civilian DoD employee since February 2003.

(U) Carney is currently assigned to the office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) section. His primary responsibility is analyzing Al Qaeda- and Iraq-relevant reporting from military detainees around the world.

Nature and Quality of Intelligence Materials

[Redacted] Carney found the volume of reporting on the subject of Al Qaeda and Iraqi links to be enormous, with thousands of reports available. Because previous analytical efforts had established the connection between Sunni radical fundamentalist groups and Shia extremists, Carney used primarily finished materials for his work. These materials most often took the forms [Redacted] completed intelligence reports. The documents were all retrieved from the DoD internal message-channeling system.

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[Redacted] Carney felt that detainee reporting, particularly from Iraqi detainees, was largely unhelpful. Many of the detainees, particularly enemy prisoners of war, were afraid to reveal what they knew to U.S. interrogators. He also believes that the interrogators are part of

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the problem, as they often seem to lack the fundamental knowledge of the subject matter to be truly effective. In part because of the limited detainee reporting, the U.S. does not have a good feel for

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He commented that no single source was consistently reliable, and added that he discarded poor-quality reports without making note of their sources.

(TS) Carney expected to find little intelligence of good quality due to both Al Qaeda's and Iraq's insistence on operational compartmentalization. He operated on the Cold War model of intelligence analysis, where he only expected to find three or four substantive documents speaking to any given topic. The volume and variable quality of the reporting required Carney to think creatively about the available intelligence. He described the process as "bouncing through links," or pursuing leads which were generated from other leads. Carney estimated that roughly ten percent of the documents he read were of interest or worth further attention. Of the leads he followed, some panned out. Others, [REDACTED] to Al Qaeda, led to dead ends. Even dead ends helped keep Carney's mind open to new possibilities. For example, reports [REDACTED] found to be false- forced Carney to realize that the scenario was still possible.

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[REDACTED] Some reporting themes became less convincing throughout Carney's examination,

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Over time, however, the flow of reliable reporting petered out. Carney now says there is "nothing concrete" to indicate the meetings took place.

(TS) One of the biggest problems Carney faced was the experience of the personnel collecting the intelligence in-theater. Many of the people working for the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) lack fundamental knowledge of the country and of Al Qaeda. Carney also never got the sense that any information or gathering efforts on the Al Qaeda-Iraq relationship made it to the "hot pile." Carney speculated that this gap was the result of two things: the inexperienced analysts did not know what they were looking for or at, while the long-time analysts reflexively dismissed any new data.

[REDACTED]

[Redacted]

Evidence of a Relationship between Al Qaeda and Iraq

[Redacted] Carney was only interested in intelligence which discussed senior level ties between Al Qaeda and Iraq. Most pieces concerned meetings between the two entities. While UBL was still in Sudan, he met with Farouk Hijazi, the Iraq intelligence chief. Later on UBL sent his deputy, Abu Hafs, to Baghdad [Redacted]

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~~(TS)~~ Carney found an Al Qaeda-Iraq relationship plausible for a number of reasons. He believes that Saddam Hussein saw fundamentalism as a form of weaponry and spent much of the 1990's trying to Islamicize the country in an attempt to inoculate his regime against fundamentalist attacks. To this end, Hussein took Hassan al-Turabi's suggestion and added the phrase "Allahu Akbar" to the Iraq state flag. [Redacted]

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~~(TS)~~ Carney noted that the morning of the interview he had seen intelligence from Document Exploitation (DocEx) which described an IIS operative who had been directed to become an Al Qaeda member. Prior to this operative's deployment, he received \$100,000 from Hussein and met with the Iraqi Vice President to discuss his mission.

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